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APPLICATION OF THE "UNSEAWORTHINESS"
DOCTRINE TO LONGSHOREMEN
LEIGHTON SHMT s, Jn.t AND THOMAS E. BYRN,
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Clarity of thought is not promoted when, by an accident of
linguistic history, two unlike things are called by the same
name. Growth by analogy has been one of the law's great
strengths but when the analogy hit upon is false the result is
confusion and stalemate.'
In the more than sixteen years which have passed since the Supreme Court's decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,2 there have
been sweeping changes in the maritime law and the maritime industry.
The Sieracki decision plowed new ground by extending the "warranty
of seaworthiness" to longshoremen. The object of this Article will be
to examine the extent to which this doctrine has developed, the legitimacy of the reasons set forth in support of the doctrine, the effect which
it has had upon the maritime industry, and the policy questions which
can now be viewed in perspective.
I. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SHIPOWNEIeS LIABILITY TO
SHORESIDE WORKERS FOR "UNSEAWORTHINESS"

To practitioners of maritime law, no review of the Sieracki case
is necessary. Stated briefly, a shipowner had entered into a contract
with Sieracki's employer, an independent contracting stevedore 3 Sieracki was engaged in the loading of a piece of large equipment into the
ship's hold. He was injured when, due to a flaw in its manufacture, a
shackle supporting part of the ship's loading gear broke. The shipowner and the shipbuilder were codefendants in the original litigation.4 The trial court held the shipbuilder liable for negligence in installing the defective shackle, but the shipowner was held not liable
tB.A. 1948, Bates College; M.A. 1950, Harvard University.
t B.S. 1934, University of Notre Dame; LL.B. 1938, Temple University. Member,
Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Byrne was counsel for petitioner in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
1 Gi.mom & BLAcK, AmutLTnn 483 (1957).
2328 U.S. 85 (1946).
a Longshoremen "refers to the laborers who do the actual physical work, whereas
the stevedore is the contractor or boss who employs longshoremen." DE KERcHOVE,
INTERNATIONAL MAmTiam DICTIONARY 432 (1948).
4 Sieracld v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
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since a reasonable examination would not have disclosed the defect.
On appeal,5 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
shipowner was liable even though he had not been negligent. The
Supreme Court, over vigorous dissent, affirmed, stating that "historically the work of loading and unloading .

.

.

[was] performed

until recent times by members of the crew" ' and that the longshoreman
"is, in short, a seaman because he is doing a seaman's work .

.

.

." '

From the longshoreman working on board ship, the application
of the "warranty of seaworthiness" has been extended to a shore-based
carpenter on board to fit out the ship for its voyage,8 and to the employee
of a ship repair company brought aboard to make repairs.' The warranty covers the employee injured by equipment which the stevedoring
contractor brings aboard,' and applies even if the employee, acting
against orders, has created the dangerous condition which produced
his injury." In fact, almost any employee of a contractor,12 working
aboard ship, who asserts that his work was historically and traditionally performed by seamen-sailors aboard a ship in the course of their
employment-seems to be covered by the warranty.
Unseaworthiness has even come ashore. The first such case was
Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic,'3 in which a longshoreman
working on a pier was injured by a piece of ship's equipment. The
doctrine has now been extended to cover a man injured while working
on the dock a hundred feet from the ship.' 4 A sandlike substance packaged in bags had been transported by ship. Some of the bags were
torn and one of the workmen was injured when he slipped in a pile of
the sand which had accumulated about a hundred feet inside the pier.
In another instance, the doctrine was extended to a longshoreman working on a pier who was run over by a railroad car. 5
5149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945).
6 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946).
7 Id. at 99.
8Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Mesle v. Kea S.S. Corp.,
260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
9

Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1960).

10 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 396 (1954).
11 Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
12 If the employee is working directly for the shipowner, his recovery is limited
to compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,

which states that the employer's liability to the employee under the act shall be
"
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
"exclusive and in place of all other liability ....
§905 (1958).
13 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
14 Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S Co., 196 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
15 Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., Civil No. 26450, E.D. Pa., Oct. 25, 1962.
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THE WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS TO NoN-SEAMEN:

AN

HISTORICAL VIEW

A. The Legal Background
Courts have imposed and extended liability on the basis of the
Supreme Court's conception that longshoremen do work formerly
done by seamen. Research of ancient and recent decisions, however,
unearthed but a single case in which a crew member was injured while
handling cargo,1 6 and the facts of that case--a lumber company ship
transporting its own cargo on a short voyage-distinguish it from the
usual situation.
In Sieracki, the Court cited Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek "
for the proposition that an injury to a stevedore is a maritime tort."8
The Court cited Florez v. The Scotia,'" The Gilbert Knapp,20 The Seguranca,2" and its own prior holding in InternationalStevedoring Co. v.
Haverty 22 as support for its statement that the work of loading and
unloading was historically and traditionally work performed by sailors.23 These three cases and all of the cases cited by Mr. Justice Hughes
in Imbrovek 24 deal only with the question of whether a stevedore is
entitled to a maritime lien. It had previously been held that the work
of loading and unloading cargo was not a maritime service and that
therefore stevedores were not entitled to maritime liens for their services. To grant such a lien, a court need only have found that the
stevedore's services were maritime in nature. This conclusion can be
reached without holding that cargo handling operations were formerly
conducted by the crew. Therefore, statements to that effect are only
dicta. History shows these statements to be inaccurate.
In 1799 the court in Swift v. The Happy Return, stated:
In this port [Philadelphia], it is the general custom to hire
others than the mariners to lade and unlade vessels. The
I Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Pillsbury, 37 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Cal. 1941) (seaman
killed while operating a winch during unloading of ship).
17 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
18 328 U.S. at 91.

19 35 Fed. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
20 37 Fed. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1889).
2158 Fed. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
22 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
23 328 U.S. at 90.
2A4234 U.S. 52, 62 (1914), citing:

Norwegian S.S. Co. v. Washington, 57 Fed.
224 (5th Cir. 1893); The Main, 51 Fed. 954 (5th Cir. 1892); The Allerton, 93
Fed. 219 (D. Ore. 1899) ; The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) ; The Gilbert
Knapp, 37 Fed. 209 (E.D. Wis. 1889); The Hattie M. Bain, 20 Fed. 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1884); The Canada, 7 Fed. 119 (D. Ore. 1881); Roberts v. The Bark Windermere,
2 Fed. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1880); The George T. Kemp, 10 Fed. Cas. 227 (No. 5341)

(D. Mass. 1876); The Circassian, 5 Fed. Cas. 702 (No. 2722) (E.D.N.Y. 1867).
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merchants find it more for their interests so to do, than to depend on the mariners, who are particularly ungovernable after
a voyage is ended; and are, when arrived at home, impatient
under confinement to the drudgery of unlading the cargo.2 5
Peters' Admiralty Decisions is probably the earliest collection of
American decisions in maritime cases. 26 Peters' comments clearly indicate that under ancient maritime codes the sailors did not load or unload
cargo, 7 but that it was done by employees of the merchant who owned
the cargo. 28 The ancient maritime codes show that, at most, the sailor's
agreement with the ship's master gave the latter the right to keep
enough of the crew on board while in port to tend to the ship's safety. 9
B. A Survey of History
1. The United States
One writer said that, in making its statement in Imbrovek, "the
Court remembered that this kind of work, as Dana vividly revealed
to us in his classic, used to be done by the seamen, the crew of the
ship . . . . "
At one point Dana describes the crew carrying hides
from carts and throwing them off a cliff to the beach below and then

hauling them to the ship anchored offshore."1 But this was not a
normal harbor; a nearby mission or ranch was the source of cargo.
Dana made uncomplimentary references to the industry of the inhabitants of Spanish California and pointed out that they "have no boats
of their own" with which to do the work. 2 Thus the crew handled
25 Swift v. The Happy Return, 23 Fed. Cas. 560, 561 (No. 13697)

(D. Pa. 1799).
6 Peters' collects maritime cases in Philadelphia between 1780 and 1806. Portions of its appendices are printed in 30 Fed. Cas. 1171 (1897).
27
"In France the owners of ships receiving freight, are not obliged to pay the
expenses of loading or unloading, but they form a separate charge against the owners
of the cargo" Laws of Oleron, 30 Fed. Cas. 1171, 1176 n.10 (1897).
2
8 Peters' notes that the merchant loaded the ship, and that in the ports of Guyenne
there were
certain officers called "arrameurs" or stowers, who were master-carpenters by
profession, and were paid by the merchants, who loaded the ship. Their
business was to dispose right, and stow closely all goods in casks ....
There were also sacquiers, who were very ancient officers, as may be seen in
the 14th book of the Theodosian Code, Unica de Saccariis Portus Romae,
lib. 14. Their business was to load and unload vessels laden with salt, corn
or fish ....
30 Fed. Cas. at 1177.
29 Article V, Laws of Oleron, provided that so long as there remained "a sufficient number of men aboard to keep the decks and lading," the rest of the crew might
go ashore even without the master's consent if they returned "in good time." 30 Fed.
Cas. 80
at 1173.
McFEE, THE LAw OF THE SEA 175 (1950).
81
DANA, Two YEARS BEFORE THE MAST 209-10 (Modern Library ed. 1936).
2 Id. at 78.
2
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cargo when there was a complete lack of facilities and no local harbor.
When Dana left Boston in 1834 on the brig Pilgrim he did not load
cargo, since he arrived on board only a few hours before sailing.3 3
When he returned to Boston two years later on board the brig Alert,
the crew had nothing to do with cargo. The crew members manned
the capstan, hauled the vessel to the wharf, and "the last turn was made
fast and the crew dismissed; and in five minutes more not a soul was
left on board the good ship Alert but the old ship-keeper, who had come
down from the counting-house to take charge of her." The Supreme Court's concept of the ancient mariner loading and
unloading his ship as well as sailing her may sound plausible and be
romantically appealing, but it is inaccurate. It does not portray recorded history except in unusual circumstances such as Dana's experience on the California coast.
Herman Melville was one of the more lucid chroniclers of American maritime history. Of a voyage he made to Liverpool in 1837, he
wrote: "As we had nothing to do with the cargo, of course, our duties
were light enough; and the chief mate was often put to it to devise
some employment for us." 5 Melville again points out that while the
crew was busy getting things ready for sea "the cargo had been already
stowed in the hold by the stevedores and lumpers from shore." 3'
Some packet lines maintained their own stevedores and crews of
longshoremen for the loading and unloading of the ships.3 Usually
however, stevedores have been independent of the shipping lines. It
must be remembered that the handling of the cargo was not an unplanned, unskilled operation-but required the combination of trained
supervisors and hard muscle.3
An instance in which a crew did unload its own vessel in the
United States was that of the Canton Packet in 1821, but this was a
favor on the part of the captain since "he allowed the crew to discharge
the ship, receiving stevedores' wages and to strip the vessel for laying
up, receiving riggers' wages." " This further illustrates that the handling of the cargo was not the normal function of the crew, but was
performed for extra pay and under unusual circumstances. In the port
of Canton itself, cargo handling was an organized trade. The only way
to do business with the Chinese Empire was through a monopolistic
3Id. at 3.
84Id. at 386.
85 MELvumL , REDBuRN 174 (Standard ed. 1922).
36 Id. at 309. Lumpers are laborers who do the work of loading and unloading.
KmxALDy, BarrisH SHIPPING 478 (1914).
37
ALBIoN, RisE OF NEW YoRK PORT 223 (1939).
3

Id. at 223.
PORTER, THE JACKSONS AND THE LEEs 11 (1937).

39 1
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organization known as the Co-Hong which "took all the necessary steps
and paid all the necessary sums to have the cargo discharged into privileged 'monopoly' lighters and brought to the factory." 40
There are a number of classic accounts of the seaman's life aboard
ship written by men who spent a great portion of their lives at sea, as
opposed to men like Dana and Melville whose time at sea was comparatively short. The account left by Samuel Kelly 4 ' deals mainly
with the 1780's. He does not mention crew members handling cargo.
All references indicate that longshoremen of various kinds performed
this work. While at Jamaica in 1781, Kelly described a "gang" bringing chests of Castile soap from the ship to shore.4 ' Also, in 1782, he
talks of "the lumpers" at Deptford who had been employed on board
the ship in connection with loading operations prior to the shipping of
the crew.
In 1788, when his ship was anchored in the Thames, Kelly
apparently was a watchman over the "many watermen on board," for
he describes catching one of them stealing sugar.'
The writings of Captain Samuel Samuels 45 cover many years at
sea. The only case in which Samuels speaks of the crew having participated in cargo loading operations was when his ship called at Odessa
during the plague. Lighters were set adrift near the vessel, caught,
loaded by the crew, and again set adrift to be picked up by the Russians.4
Conversely, Samuels speaks of having paid his crew off and
then remaining in Hamburg because "the discharging of our cargo
occupied three weeks." 4
In addition to the works already mentioned, there exist records
in diaries, books of account, and business biographies, which demonstrate that the work of loading and unloading was not performed by the
trained seamen, who were anxious to get ashore on completion of the
voyage and similarly anxious to stay there until the last moment before
sailing.
In 1790 Salem's Union Wharf had a prescribed set of charges
which was accepted by other pier and wharf owners.4
Unloading of
barrels was one cent each; ballast and brick were unloaded at eight
cents per ton; the charge for bales or boxes was five cents each.
4

o MORSE, THE TRADE AND ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA 286 (rev.
SAMUEL KELLY: AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SEAMAN (Garstin

41

ed. 1913).
ed. 1925).

42 Id.at 35.
43 Id. at 73.
45

Id.at 160.
SAMUELS, FROM THE FORECASTLE TO THE CABIN

46 Id.at 193.
47 Id.at 240.

(1887).

The length of time may be attributed to the fact that the cargo
was sold on a piecemeal basis to obtain greater profit.
48 1 BENTLEY, Dmay 143 (1905).
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Some of the founding fathers would have been surprised at the
concept of sailors loading and unloading, for the books of John Hancock's firm reveal the payments of "charges for cleaning out ballast
29.17.3." 4 The entry in question was dated 1754. There were complaints of other merchants about unloading charges at Lisbon and in
Ireland in 1774.50 Correspondence between owners and captains makes
it clear that the cost of handling cargo was distinct from the cost of
vessel operation, which included crew's wages.
Thomas Bailey Aldrich described Portsmouth in the middle 18th
century when it had become a "ghost town."
There are no ships lying at the pier-heads; there are no
gangs of stevedores staggering under heavy cases of mer[A]t the windows of these musty countchandise . . ..
ing-rooms . . . used to stand portly merchants..
waiting for their ships to come up the Narrows; the cries of
stevedores and the chants of sailors at the windlass . . ..
2. Great Britain
The substantial difference between water level at high and low
tides had a significant effect upon the English handling of cargo, particularly at London. These tides prevented all but the smallest flatbottom vessels from mooring to a wharf. Most vessels entering English ports, particularly London, moored in mid-river at such well-known
anchorages as Deptford, Blackwall, and North Fleet. Much of the
cargo was in barrels which were rolled from the ship onto lighters tied
alongside."2 This method could only be effectively employed through
the overall direction of experienced stevedores using their own men.
The City Corporation of London "claimed immemorially the right" of
regulating everything connected with the "unloading and delivery of
merchandise imported into the port." '3 The "porters" who handled
the cargoes were tightly organized into brotherhoods, with each handling goods based upon type, point of origin, or destination. The
"ticket porters handled and shipped off goods imported from or exported to all parts of America." I This guild or union became so
strong that by the middle of the eighteenth century "no labour in the
port could be performed by any other person whilst there was a sufficient
number of these men offering themselves." "
49

BAXTER, THE HousE OF HANCOCK 126 (1945).
50 1 MASSACHusETTs HIsToicAi SocmTy, CommERCE OF RHODE ISLAND 1726-

1800,5 1at 478 (1914).
5

ALDRcir, AN OLD TOWN BY THE SEA 9-11 (3d ed. 1894).
2 BROODBANK, HISTORY OF THE PORT OF LONDON 372, 409 (1921).

m Id. at 409.
at 427-28.
55 Id. at 430.
5Id.
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Commencing in 1802, huge wetdocks were opened. These were
surrounded by high stone walls, contained extensive storage warehouse
space, and were equipped with locks to keep the water at a constant
level. Once inside the dock with the lock dosed, a ship could tie to
the wharf unaffected by the tides. After a vessel had entered such a
wetdock "all her crew save for one responsible officer, had to leave her.
Only men employed by the dock company were allowed to discharge
under the direction of one of the company's own foremen." " The
porters who had formerly loaded and unloaded ships in the stream
were absorbed into the personnel of the dock company."
Each dock had its permanent laborers and its extra men, varying
from 200 permanent men for the West India Dock Company to 24
permanent men for the East India Dock Company, which had some
hundred other men employed as lumpers or laborers.5 Large numbers
of casual laborers were needed because of the seasonal nature of the trade
and the irregular arrival of vessels. Even during the London dock
strike of 1889, vessels were not unloaded by their crews, but were diverted to Antwerp and Rotterdam for unloading. 9
There has always been this emphasis upon specialization of labor
to perform efficiently the various tasks, whether sailing the vessel or
loading and unloading it. The economic needs of the owner dictated
that the vessel lie idle in port only a minimum length of time. A member of the crew was normally not expected to participate in the handling of cargo. If it was done by crew members in an emergency the
sailor was paid extra for the work. This was practically never done in
an organized port, and it was never the case that longshoremen, proceeded to sea with the vessel as crew members. Longshoremen never
encountered the real "perils of the sea" as did the sailor. Seamanship
in the days of sail was a specialized activity, requiring four or more
years of training at sea before a man was rated as an able seaman and
paid as such. A sailor signed on a ship for a voyage, appeared immediately before sailing, and left the ship promptly when the voyage was
concluded. While to a landsman the work of sailing a ship and the
work of loading and unloading it may both seem maritime in nature,
to a sailor only running the ship is maritime.6 0
Even in medieval England the differentiation between sailor and
longshoreman was maintained. "The task of discharging salt from
56 GROSVENOR, THE PORT OF LONDON 64 (1957).
57 BROODBANK, op. cit. sipra note 52, at 431.
58
59

Id.at 431, 434.
Id.at 443.

6o See GROSVENOR, op. cit. sipra note 56, at 64. See also THORNTON, BRITISH
SHIPPING 255-57 (1945) ; VImIERs, THE WAY OF A SHIP (1953).
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these ships was generally performed by special porters whose terms
of hire were prescribed by the town council of the port where they
worked." 4 This was true of Bristol as well as London. We find
that in November 1282 unloading at Vintry Wharf, London, was
performed by "four gangs of wyndrawers of twelve men each, for the
union rule is that there shall never be less than twelve men to a job of
this sort." 62 A high degree of specialization also existed in the middle
ages, with certain wharves handling certain products only. "There
were other fees for hoisting the casks, placing them on the wharf, and
removing them to warehouses or cellars in the town. This work was
usually done by special privileged gangs; at Ipswich the 'beremen',
porters, or 'wyndrawers' consisted of a master and twelve men." I
Significantly, during this entire period, and for centuries before,
guild
system was strong in England and elsewhere. One authority
the
on the guild system writes: "The Thames lighterman and the Billingsgate porter are perhaps the most picturesque, as they are certainly the
most ancient, types of London industry. Their modes of work have
varied very little during the twenty centuries which have elapsed since
the Romans brought them-if indeed they did not find them." " The
porters at Queenhithe and Billingsgate Wharves, working under the
supervision of the Corn and Salt Meters, were long-established by the
13th century and retained their jurisdiction to the middle of the 19th
century.6 5 Unwin, referring to two groups of street porters and ticket
porters, says:
[B] esides these two bodies, there were two others-the predecessors of the modern stevedores-who worked on the
wharves and in the vessels lading and unlading; one section
being employed by the Tackle House Porters appointed by
the twelve great companies to handle the goods of English
merchants, and the other section being under the direction
of the Packer appointed by the city to superintend lading and
unlading of the goods of foreign merchants.66
3. Ancient History
Since Greek cities depended upon revenue from harbor or customs dues, the harbors were well-organized. 6 Sailors or mariners are
61

BREDBURY, ENGLAND AND THE SALT TRADE IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

(1955).
62

136-67

UNWIN, FINANCE AND TRADE UNDER EDWARD III, at
63 SALZmAN, ENGLISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 397
64

UNWN, THE GuiLDs AND CoMPANIES OF LONDON

65 Id.at 359.

22 (1918).
(1931).
352 (1908).

66 Id. at 360.
6

7See CASSON, THE ANCIENT MARINERS 112 (1959); MICH=, THE ECONOMICS
oF ANCIENT GRIE 257 (2d ed. 1957).
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mentioned as separate categories from the men who loaded or unloaded
the vessels. 8 There were guild organizations of harbor porters, 9 and
the separation of categories of endeavor according to guilds was
universal.7 °
Tenney Frank, an authoritative writer on ancient Rome, makes
clear the distinction between the men who sailed the ships and those
who did the labor on or about them while in port. This was due in
part to the separate guilds for shipwrights, stevedores [stuppartores],
the dock hands who loaded sand ballast [saburrarii], the unloaders of
grain in sacks [saccarii], and the general laboring longshoremen
[geruli]. 7 Perhaps another reason for the distinction was that the
mariners who sailed the ships were of the warrior class. One of their
main duties was defense of the vessel against pirates.'2 Lack of navigational instruments forced the ships to sail close to shore, and piracy
was common.73 Vessels bound for Rome had to be unloaded at Ostia,
a port constructed about 44 B.C. at the mouth of the River Tiber.
From there the cargoes were taken by tenders and barges up the river
to the city. Frank comments upon the difficulty of making calculations as to the cost of shipment of cargoes because the work of transshipment from the ocean going vessels to the barges and lighters was
performed by day laborers. 74 He attributes the lack of more precise
information "to the increasing practice of having work performed by
contract and of recording only the sum paid for the entire task without
giving enough particulars to make it possible to determine the pay per
day for the labor involved." 7' He also states that the unloaders of
grain would go out in small craft to meet the ocean going ship, would
trans-ship the cargo, and bring it ashore so that the ocean going ships
could sail again as quickly as possible. He notes further that "the
inscriptions at Ostia indicate the presence of thousands of laborers in
the service, working as measurers, stevedores, bargemen, warehouse
men and record keepers . ...

Historical evidence thus clearly indicates that the work of loading
and unloading ships was never the traditional work of the mariners
who sailed them. That is not to say that crew members never did this
6

8 GLoTz, ANCIENT GREECE AT WoRE 171, 301 (1926).
69 2 R STOVTZEFF, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

788 (1941).
70 1 id. at 397;

GLOTz, op. cit. supra note 68, at 368-69.
715 FRANx, AN ECONOMIC SURvEY OF ANCIENT Roi
72

249-50 (1938).
See 3 id. at 303.
73 5 id. at 270; CASSON, op. cit. mspra note 67, at 179-80.
74 4 FRANK, AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ANCIENT ROME 408-09 (1938).
75 Ibid.
765 id. at 220.

1963]

"UNSEA WORTHINESS" APPLIED TO LONGSHOREMEN

1147

work. Where there was no other group available, the sailor was called
on to perform it. However, in these instances it was treated as extra
work and compensated for as such.

III.

TH1E EFFECT OF THE EXTENSION OF THE SEAWORTHINESS
DOCTRINE

A. The Individual Longshorenan
Few compensation acts provide greater benefits for the disabled
worker than does the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.77

Present maximum benefits under that act are $70 per

week, free of all taxes. 71 Provision is also made for all medical, hospital, and nursing services.'
And yet, Sieracki gives the worker the
alternative of suing a non-negligent shipowner with the guarantee that
his recovery will be at least what he is entitled to under compensation.8"
Although the Supreme Court's motivations in Sieracki were humanitarian, an examination of the available evidence raises doubt that, in
practice, the doctrine has been the humanitarian instrument the court

intended.
In Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield,8 ' a longshoreman's widow
was the plaintiff. At the time the award was made, her attorney obtained 50% of the total award as his fee.82 Counsel involved in the case
reports that the net cash recovery to the widow was $1,597.45, out of
a gross cost to the employer of $24,293.71. It is estimated that the
recovery under compensation would have been $23,790.65-to which
the widow would have been entitled without litigation. Of course, she
still got that amount, for the Compensation Act provides that if the net
recovery against the third party is less than it would have been under
compensation, compensation makes up the difference." Thus, a case
which should have required the expenditure of $23,790.65 was increased
to $46,486.91 with no increase in the net benefit to the widow.
In another case in which a longshoreman had been killed, the
total settlement was $215,000. Of that sum, there remained for distribution to the widow and five dependent children $141,017.51 after
deductions for "fees, costs and a claim in subrogation."

84

7744 Stat 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §901 (1958).
7875 Stat. 203 (1961), 33 U.S.C.A. §906 (Supp. 1962).
79 44 Stat. 1427 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 907 (1958).
80 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (Supp. II, 1961).
81 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
82
Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 809 (E.D. Va. 1960).
The court declared that "fair and reasonable compensation" for the plaintiff's attorney
"is fixed at one-half of the recovery."

8373 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (Supp. II, 1961).
84Olson Estate, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 622, 625 (Orphans' Ct. 1961).
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Many people believe that compensation is a mere pittance, but that
belief hardly accords with the facts. A widow recently instituted suit
rather than accept compensation for the death of her husband. 5 The
settlement called for an award of $80,000. An attorney's fee of
$26,174.92, plus other expenses incurred by the attorney of $1,474.25
left the widow and children $52,349.83. No one really questioned
whether the attorney had rendered the family a service since the widow
now had more than $50,000 in cash, yet the benefits payable over
a period of years would have amounted, under compensation, to
$94,110.84.8
There is also a real question whether longshoremen or their dependents, unaccustomed by training or experience to manage an investment program, are better protected by regular weekly payments or
lump-sum awards. One successful longshoreman-plaintiff 87 drove his
33-foot cabin cruiser aground."8 A rough rule of thumb is that cabin
cruisers cost about $1,000 per foot. On any such basis, the cruiser
must have represented a very substantial percentage of his net recovery.
That a cabin cruiser served the longshoreman's best interest from a
humanitarian viewpoint may be open to question.
B. The Maritime Industry
In the sixteen year period since Sieracki was decided, approximately forty-four American steamship companies have ceased to operate, or are presently in the process of withdrawal and liquidation.8"
This is confined to companies directly involved with the stevedoring
problem and excludes harbor craft, tankers, and specialized vessels
85
8

6

Caulfield v. Calmar S.S. Corp., Civil No. 25890, E.D. Pa., May 18, 1962.
In this case, the decedent's wages were $5500 per year; widow's age was 43; her

life expectancy was 36.7. OFFICE OF VrIAL STATIsTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF HALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, LiFE TABLES. At the time of death, the children were 8

years, 7 years, 5 years, and 4 years respectively. The computation is as follows:
$70.00 per week X 52 weeks X 11 years (35% of wages to widow;
15% for each child; maximum $70.00 weekly) ............
$40,040.00
12th and 13th years (second child then 18) ...................
7,098.00
14th year (third child then 18) ...............................
2,730.00
Widow's remaining life expectancy, 22.7 years at $1929.20 ......
43,792.84
Funeral expenses ............................................

93,660.84
450.00

Total recovery ...............................................
94,110.84
Social Security benefits would accrue in addition. Of course, to achieve a meaningful
comparison, the $94,110.84 must be reduced to present worth.
87
Brabazon v. Belships Co., 103 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d
904 (3d Cir. 1953).
88 Phila. Evening Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1959, p. 5, col. 1.
89 Included in this list are some companies which have ceased operation and
surrendered their franchises, and whose ships are now for sale.
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which do not need large numbers of longshoremen working on and
about the ship. °
There are, of course, other factors which led to the demise of
American shipping. Its problems have been many. That the added
costs of longshoremen's injury claims is, however, a factor-and probably a substantial one-is demonstrated by the fact that the attrition
rate has been the greatest in coastwise and inter-coastal shipping which
is constantly exposed to the effects of the doctrine by repeated and
frequent calls at American ports. To the best of our knowledge there
are no steamship companies still engaged in coastwise carriage of general cargo on the Atlantic, the Gulf, or the Pacific coasts. 9 ' The intercoastal fleet has been reduced from 123 to twelve ships, operated by
only two companies, Calmar Steamship Corporation and Weyerhaeuser
Steamship Company. Neither is a common carrier in the true sense
of the term, for each confines itself principally to carrying pulp and lumber eastbound and steel westbound. It is possible, but doubtful, that the
Supreme Court in Sieracki foresaw this revolution in ocean transportation.
Congress, through the Maritime Administration, has sought to
build up the American fleet and the American merchant marine. The
Defense Department has encouraged this function in order to cope with
its logistics problems. However, an effect of the application of the
unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen has been to help to destroy
faster than the Federal Maritime Board can build. 2
Precise figures on the total cost to the industry are not available.
There is information from a variety of sources which makes it possible
to formulate certain conclusions. Between 194 5 -the last pre-Sieracki
year-and 1954, insurance rates rose 6007 and seven companies had
withdrawn from writing the insurance which covers such liability.9
Largely as the result of indemnity in favor of the shipowner against
the stevedore, 4 insurance rates for the latter have increased from
9
OE.g., Seatrain Lines and Sea-Land Service which carry rail cars and trailer
bodies in coastal commerce.
lExcepting Seatrain Lines and Sea-Land Service, both specialized carriers.
92
Merchant Marine Act, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1101
(1958). Its purposes are to foster development and maintenance of a merchant marine
of well-equipped and suitable vessels, not only for commerce but as auxiliaries in
time of war or national emergency. Actually subsidies were narrowly confined to
eleven companies-the "Twelve Apostles" having been reduced to that number by
the demise of Seas Shipping Co. Time, Feb. 22, 1963, p. 82, recently noted that while
"more than half the U.S. ships in overseas trade are already on subsidy to the tune
of $300 million" annually, this has not been enough to prevent a 41.9% reduction in
the fleet in the last ten years, from 933 to 542.

93 Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CoREul L.Q. 381, 417 n.163 (1954).
94Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960);
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Ryan Stevedoring

Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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"approximately $7.00 per $100.00 of payroll" in 1954,"5 to $18.60 in
November of 1962.9" That does not take into account the losses of the
steamship companies for which indemnity is not obtained.
Estimates of the total "bill" range from ten to eighteen million
dollars per year,"7 using calculations based upon the total payroll for
the stevedoring industry. If the estimates can serve as a basis for
calculation, the amounts involved in a span of years are staggering.
The attrition which these costs produce in the industry creates unemployment for sailors and longshoremen. 8 There is more than a single
facet to "humanitarianism."
The first eight monthly advance sheets of American Maritime
Cases for 1962 reveal seventy reported decisions involving claims by
longshoremen based upon "unseaworthiness." This includes all courts
throughout the country. Four law firms represented thirty-four of the
plaintiffs, indicating a considerable degree of concentration. Of course,
no more than three or four percent of all suits filed go to trial. An
even smaller percentage result in a published opinion. In many cases
there are either no post-trial motions by the defendant, or the motions
are denied without opinion. Only an infinitesimal percentage of the
total ever reaches an appellate court.
Can any conclusion be drawn from all this? It seems arguable
that approximately 40% of the total estimated cost to the industry of
the extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine is for lawyers' fees, 99 and
half of that would appear to be divided among a very few law firms.
To suppose that insurance companies bear the loss is another flight of
fancy. Some steamship companies carry no insurance to cover risks
such as this. High cost and the belief that an efficient company-where efficiency can reduce losses-must contribute to the losses of the
inefficient, 1°° plays a part in this decision. More important, however,
is the fact that insurance companies do not bear the loss in any true
sense. The rates charged are based upon loss experience, and in the
great majority of instances they are retrospective or are carried in
mutuals whose participants are subject to "calls" as losses must be paid.
9

5 Tetreault, supra note 93, at 417.

96 Letter From Counsel for New York Shipping Ass'n to the authors, Nov. 28,

1962.

97
Hearings on Warranty of Seaworthiness: Third Party Liability, Before the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Committee on Merchant Marine

and Fisheries,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1961).
9
8 Between 1956 and 1960 there was a decrease of 19.26% in the total man-hours
worked by all longshore labor in the Port of Philadelphia. Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n-International Longshoremen's Ass'n Central Records Bureau. Between
1951 and 1961 the drop was 28.5% or 912 jobs averaging 1500 work hours per year.
99 That does not include the fees and expense of defending the actions.
100 The cost of negligently inflicted injury has been cast out of the calculations
used herein. However, one insurance covers both.
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Under such systems, the losses are simply totalled. To that total is
added the cost of what insurance companies call "production" [the
sales commission] and the pro rata share of the insurance companies'
other costs, overhead, and profit. Some convenient divisor-usually
tonnage of the ships covered-is divided into that total and that becomes
the rate the shipping company pays for its insurance. The only time
an insurer cannot reimburse itself is when, after a catastrophic loss,' 01
the insured is able to shift to another underwriter who is willing to
ignore part of the loss in order to get the business. This is sometimes
done in the belief that history of that sort will not repeat itself.102
An underwriter who operated differently would not long be competitive. If it paid part of the shipping company's losses with profits
from another line of business, it would soon lose it competitive position
since neither its marine risks nor its other risks would show sufficient
profit to justify continuance without a rate increase. It is for these
reasons that insurers operate as they do, and for these same reasons
they will simply stop writing a line of insurance which does not show
a profit over the long haul.
That premiums are high may not, in fact, be undesirable from the
standpoint of the underwriter. The higher premium gives it an opportunity to make a greater investment income during the period between
the time the premium is collected and the time that same money must
be paid out to satisfy an adverse judgment. There is another advantage. Insurers value their relations with large brokers who, in the
course of years, have much business of all kinds to place. The brokers'
income is usually a percentage of the premium. There is, therefore,
little incentive on the part of the insurance industry for lower premiums.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Imposition of absolute liability based upon a judicial determination
that stevedoring is "hazardous" will not withstand analysis. Loading
and unloading ships is not as hazardous as many other occupations.
Steel erection, mining, and logging are examples which come readily
to mind. The federal judiciary, we suggest, has simply been more
aware of the hazards of stevedoring due to its prolonged exposure to
a greater number of personal injury suits by longshoremen than by any
other class except possibly railroad workers. This is probably attributable to the higher awards given by federal juries and the fact that
longshoremen can get into federal court under admiralty as well as
101 Such as the loss of a vessel and crew. See The Mormnackite, 184 F. Supp.
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
102 Such was the actual fact after the loss of the Mormackite and the heavy losses
there involved.
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diversity jurisdiction. The concept of stevedoring as a hazardous or
ultra-hazardous occupation prompted federal judges to search for-and
find-new grounds upon which to justify damage awards. The judges
were probably further motivated by the fact that a lump-sum award
always seems larger than a compensation award paid over a period
of time.
The recent trend toward indemnity awards to the shipowner from
the stevedore 103 may be the result of judicial recognition of the damage
done to the shipping industry from this application of the "warranty of
seaworthiness." At best, this is a stopgap measure since it makes little
difference whether shipping companies cannot compete because of large
damage awards against them or because of high stevedoring charges.
The dollar the stevedore pays the ocean carrier today by way of indemnity will be added to the stevedoring rate tomorrow. That rate in turn
increases the cost of transportation, thus extending the effect beyond
the shipping industry. A difference of only two or three cents in
freight rates frequently determines whether a foreign buyer purchases
products of American or European manufacture." °4 The European
Common Market will have a serious enough effect upon our export
market without the additional factor of increased transportation costs.
Moreover, this policy of indemnification seems to clash with congressional intent. The obligation to pay benefits regardless of fault was
made "exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
.

.

to the employee . . .. , 105

It is doubtful that anyone benefits when one jury verdict can wipe
out the earnings of a ship for an entire year. That recoveries for unseaworthiness are in the humanitarian interests of the class for whose
benefit the doctrine was designed, is far from clear. We submit, however, that one fact is abundantly certain. The courts have either misread, or have not read, the facts of history. The results have been farreaching and the end is by no means in sight.
103 See cases cited note 94 supra.
104 See Tetreault, supra note 93, at 417 n.164 and text accompanying note 93 supra.

10344 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958).
[As this Article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court announced
its decision in Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 31 U.S.L. W=zi 4528 (U.S. May 27, 1963).
The Court held that compensation was not necessarily the exclusive remedy of the
longshoreman against his employer. Therefore, notes 12 & 105 and accompanying text
are no longer accurate.]

